bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq@35.5.3
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package downloads and executes a second-stage binary. It fetches a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS fetch fails, it falls back to a DNS-TXT command channel on wel1[.]ru subdomains (sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru), reassembling a base64-encoded payload from numbered TXT records. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' (or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows). A stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state limits re-execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:20 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:06 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-filter@35.5.3
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- snavbox@1.0.1
- dolyame-boxy-stories-of-block@35.8.6
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.