bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-breadcrumbs@35.8.2
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-breadcrumbs (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads a bundled polyfill that downloads and executes a remote binary. It fetches a payload over HTTPS from oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on platform. If the HTTP download fails it reconstructs a second-stage payload from base64 chunks retrieved via DNS TXT queries against c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under the Windows temp dir), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c "<file> &" or cmd.exe /c start /b. A cooldown marker file is written to /tmp/.analytics_state to limit re-downloads.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:01 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:22 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-notification@35.3.8
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu@35.8.5
- bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-search@35.2.6
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq@35.5.3
- dolyame-boxy-stories-of-block@35.8.6
- bigops-products-bnpl@35.2.9
- beaver-ui-pagination@35.3.7
- bigops-nitro-client@35.6.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.