beaver-ui-subheader@35.7.2
Malicious code in beaver-ui-subheader (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package runs a bootstrap routine that downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary and executes it. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from rotated Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If the HTTP download fails it falls back to a DNS-based channel that reads chunked base64 data from TXT records under c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (discovery domains sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe (Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c "<file> &". A stamp file (/tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state) throttles re-execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:13 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:54 PM
Related advisories
- bi-core-bi-core-core@35.8.5
- dolyame-ui-dropdown@35.6.2
- dolyame-ui-constants@35.5.9
- dolyame-ui-checkbox@35.6.9
- dolyame-ui-label@35.7.8
- dolyame-ui-layout@35.9.8
- dolyame-ui-money@35.6.1
- dolyame-ui-mixins@35.1.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.