dolyame-ui-money@35.6.1
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-money (npm)
Analysis
dolyame-ui-money (advertised as "React components") executes a remote binary download-and-run payload the moment the module is required. On load it contacts a rotated set of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) over HTTPS and fetches a platform-specific binary from /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it reassembles a second-stage payload from base64 chunks served via DNS TXT records under sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, and net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to a temp file (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "file &" on Unix). It suppresses itself when DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, or DO_NOT_TRACK is set.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:04 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:51 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-mixins@35.1.4
- beaver-ui-search-dropdown@35.4.5
- bigops-alerts-widget@35.8.3
- dolyame-ui-codemods@35.2.6
- bigops-products-bnpl@35.2.9
- bigops-products-deposits@35.9.1
- bigops-status-selection@35.3.2
- bigops-statements-timeline@35.2.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.