dolyame-ui-icon@35.7.5
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-icon (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads a bundled bootstrap that downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe, with a DNS-TXT fallback channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process. This is a multi-stage remote binary dropper that fetches and executes an arbitrary second-stage payload at install/require time.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:06 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:54 PM
Related advisories
- beaver-ui-smart-filter@35.1.9
- beaver-ui-subheader@35.7.2
- bi-core-bi-core-core@35.8.5
- dolyame-ui-dropdown@35.6.2
- dolyame-ui-constants@35.5.9
- dolyame-ui-checkbox@35.6.9
- dolyame-ui-label@35.7.8
- dolyame-ui-layout@35.9.8
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.