dolyame-ui-styles@35.1.4
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-styles (npm)
Analysis
The package's main entry (index.js) loads _platform.js, which fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to a DNS TXT exfiltration channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c '... &'. The package is a decoy named as a UI-styles library; merely requiring it triggers the download and execution of the remote binary.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:20 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:36 PM
Related advisories
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- dolyame-ui-editor@35.6.6
- bigops-procedure-file-handlers@35.7.6
- dolyame-ui-navigation@35.7.3
- dolyame-ui-list@35.2.6
- bigops-operator-status@35.4.5
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.