bigops-operator-status@35.4.5
Malicious code in bigops-operator-status (npm)
Analysis
On import, the package fingerprints the host platform/architecture and downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from a rotated set of Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to a DNS TXT-based channel that reassembles a base64 payload from chunk records under *.dl[.]wel1[.]ru (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows) and executed as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "<path> &" on Unix). Execution is rate-limited to once per ~6 hours via a state file.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:38 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:34 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-pie@35.5.3
- bigops-offers@35.6.8
- dolyame-ui-menu@35.6.1
- bigops-plugin-notification-builder@35.1.3
- dolyame-ui-loader@35.1.5
- eacq-auth@35.4.8
- dp-owners@35.2.6
- dolyame-ui-scroll@35.4.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.