dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-popup@35.9.3
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-popup (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads a platform-specific binary payload and executes it in the background. It fetches the payload over HTTPS from rotating Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If those fail it reconstructs the payload from base64 chunks retrieved via DNS TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (with sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru as per-platform domains). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the temp dir on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c "&" so it outlives the parent process. The package otherwise exports a no-op BNPL-popup class; the download-and-execute behaviour is the entire purpose.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:42 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:41 PM
Related advisories
- dippy-invertor@35.1.6
- devplatform-i18n@35.6.2
- dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-image-card@35.7.7
- bigops-storio-ngrx-component-store@35.3.4
- devplatform-zod-wip-api@35.9.3
- devplatform-create-nx-spa@35.4.9
- deposits-common@35.5.4
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-image-popup@35.9.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.