eacq-acq-menu@35.2.1
Malicious code in eacq-acq-menu (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package runs a hidden adapter that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary. It fingerprints the OS/arch, then fetches a payload over HTTPS from rotating Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If those fail it falls back to a DNS TXT-record channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru (and sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. A marker file (.analytics_state / analytics_state) throttles repeat execution. The package also ships an 81KB decoy analytics-SDK module.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:58 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:20 PM
Related advisories
- devplatform-jscodeshift-utils@35.3.8
- devplatform-api-v2-resource-mock@35.4.1
- devplatform-react-form@35.8.3
- devplatform-po-loader@35.1.8
- devplatform-spa-plugin-devtools@35.5.6
- devplatform-api-v2-resources@35.3.8
- devplatform-ui-notification@35.3.6
- dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-dangerously-html@35.5.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.