bigops-informer@35.4.8
Malicious code in bigops-informer (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package silently downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers infrastructure. It fingerprints the host (os.platform + os.arch), then fetches a binary from one of four obfuscated mirror hosts (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) via HTTPS GET to /pkg/package (or /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe depending on platform). If HTTP fails, it falls back to DNS TXT-based retrieval via wel1[.]ru domains (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The downloaded binary is written to /tmp/.cache_<random> (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe (Windows) and spawned as a detached background process with stdio ignored. The package's exported API (BigopsInformer class) is a dummy — all malicious behaviour runs on import via _bootstrap.js.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:56 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 06:58 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.