dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-open-api@20.8.9
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-open-api (npm)
Analysis
dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-open-api@20.8.9 is a trojanized multi-stage downloader. The package ships a decoy stub (index.js) that immediately loads _helpers.js, which fingerprints the host OS/architecture and downloads a binary payload from Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) via HTTPS GET to paths like /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS download fails, it falls back to DNS TXT steganography via c[.]tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, where TXT records encode the payload in base64 chunks. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_* (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_*.exe (Windows) and spawned as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c "path &"). A rate-limiting stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state prevents re-execution within 20840 seconds. The package has no lifecycle hooks — the payload runs on require() via the main entry point.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 2, 2026, 04:27 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 2, 2026, 04:28 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.