LWA-2026-14046 confirmed malware

dct-baileys@1.0.1

Malicious code in dct-baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1102 · Web ServiceT1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer

Analysis

dct-baileys@1.0.1, an unaffiliated fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web API library, carries an injected remote-control block in lib/Socket/newsletter.js that runs whenever a socket is created. Ninety seconds after startup the code loads node-fetch, base64-decodes the hidden string "aHR0cHM6Ly9kZXctbWQtZGF0YS5wYWdlcy5kZXYvY2hhbm5lbC5qc29u" to the endpoint hxxps://dew-md-data[.]pages[.]dev/channel[.]json, downloads a JSON array of WhatsApp newsletter (channel) JIDs, and then silently submits a WhatsApp mex "iq" follow query (hardcoded query_id 7871414976211147) for each JID, one every three seconds, discarding every error. The endpoint URL never appears in plaintext anywhere in the tarball — it exists only as a base64 literal — and the 90-second delay plus swallowed exceptions hide the activity from both static review and the operator of the host application. Because the JID list is supplied by a remote host at runtime, the set of channels the user's WhatsApp session is made to follow can be changed at will without publishing a new version. No other non-WhatsApp network destination exists in the package; the payload is a covert remote-driven channel-subscription hook, not local file access (the only child_process use is the standard ffmpeg thumbnail call in lib/Utils/messages-media.js). IOC: hxxps://dew-md-data[.]pages[.]dev/channel[.]json.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 15, 2026, 09:10 AM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 09:12 AM
weekly installs
239

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.