@panzproject/baileys@1.0.3
Malicious code in @panzproject/baileys (npm)
Analysis
This package is a trojanized fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library: it keeps the upstream API but injects account-manipulating behaviour into the client factory that consumers import. lib/custom.js ships a configuration object with autoFollow enabled, the hardcoded newsletter JID 120363433262450351@newsletter, and a fixed default pairing code of PANZPRJ1. lib/Socket/index.js, the package's main socket factory, calls autoFollowChannels() on every connection that reaches the 'open' state, which invokes sock.newsletterFollow() against that hardcoded channel with 2-second retries; following is on by default and can only be turned off by editing the shipped constant. The same file overrides sock.requestPairingCode so a caller that does not pass an explicit code is silently returned the fixed, publicly known code PANZPRJ1. On load the package prints a styled ANSI-art banner advertising the fork. Network access observed in the code is limited to WhatsApp servers, a version check against the upstream Baileys repository, and caller-supplied media URLs; no obfuscation, dynamic code evaluation or remote command channel is present in the shipped files.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 13, 2026, 02:14 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 13, 2026, 02:22 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.