LWA-2026-13619 confirmed malware

@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-130

Malicious code in @adminide-stack/utils (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1082 · System Information DiscoveryT1102 · Web ServiceT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer

Analysis

@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-130 ships a hidden module-load-time loader appended to its main entry lib/index.js. After the legitimate webpack bundle (src/index.ts -> src/logger.ts) the file contains an obfuscated block built on a custom string-permutation routine (integer key schedules, a "spin" shuffle function, splitLane/peel wrappers) that reconstructs the identifier "module" and the identifier "eval" and then executes about 8KB of permuted JavaScript via eval with global and require in scope, storing a marker on global (`global.z = global.i + "-II"`). The hidden code therefore runs whenever a dependent application, build or test suite require()s the package. The same loader build (0.0.16-129) reaches out to public Ethereum RPC endpoints 1rpc[.]io (/eth), eth-mainnet[.]public[.]blastapi[.]io, eth[.]drpc[.]org and ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com, calling eth_blockNumber, eth_getBlockByNumber and eth_getTransactionCount, reads the transaction history of address 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3 through eth[.]blockscout[.]com (/api?module=account&action=txlist), and then issues GET requests to the paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls carrying the custom header `Sec-V: A10-npm_inject` toward the host resolved from that on-chain data. Because the C2 destination is derived from blockchain state at runtime, no command-and-control hostname appears anywhere in the source.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 4, 2026, 12:06 AM
analyzed
Nov 4, 2026, 12:07 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.