@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-129
Malicious code in @adminide-stack/utils (npm)
Analysis
@adminide-stack/utils@0.0.16-129 ships a hidden loader appended to the end of its main entry file, lib/index.js. After roughly 50KB of ordinary webpack output, the file runs eval(atob("...")), decoding a second-stage script whose first statement sets the global marker i = 'A10-npm_inject'. That stage is a custom-obfuscated bundle (large base64 string array with a hand-written decoder and _0xNNNN identifier indirection) that resolves its configuration from the Ethereum blockchain instead of from a hardcoded command host. The decoded payload contacts the public Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints hxxps://ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com/, hxxps://eth-mainnet[.]public[.]blastapi[.]io/, hxxps://eth[.]drpc[.]org/ and hxxps://1rpc[.]io/eth, issuing eth_blockNumber, eth_getBlockByNumber and eth_getTransactionCount. It also queries the block explorer hxxps://eth[.]blockscout[.]com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3 to read transaction history for the attacker-controlled address 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3 (the address is stored split into fragments, e.g. '0x1eEf0849' + 'AD15d87f6' + '4e51C73C84', to defeat string scanning). The on-chain data supplies the next-stage command source, so no fixed C2 hostname appears in the code. The loader then issues GET requests to the paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls carrying the non-standard header Sec-V: A10-npm_inject and a spoofed desktop Chrome User-Agent, and handles gzip/deflate-compressed responses (node:zlib, x-gzip). The retrieved content is executed through eval/Function, with a fallback that spawns a Node child process (node:child_process) running the fetched script. Marker strings used by the payload include 'x-payload-', 'Payload-B6' and 'Sec-V'. The package declares no install hook; the payload sits in the module's main entry (lib/index.js) and therefore executes whenever the library is required by a dependent application. No .npmrc, NPM_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, ~/.ssh or ~/.aws access was found in the shipped code; the observed malicious behaviour is blockchain-resolved configuration retrieval and remote code execution.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 4, 2026, 12:06 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 4, 2026, 12:08 AM
Related advisories
browse all confirmed advisories →Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.