LWA-2026-13356 confirmed malware

@walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1

Malicious code in @walknpm/todo-cli (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.004 · Unix ShellT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1071.001 · Web ProtocolsT1036 · MasqueradingT1082 · System Information DiscoveryT1496 · Resource Hijacking

Analysis

@walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 ships a working todo CLI but registers a postinstall hook, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that deploys a cryptocurrency miner on every install. The script downloads a gzipped carrier from a presigned S3 URL at amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment[.]s3[.]amazonaws[.]com (path /amplify-cfn-templates/cloud-backend-cache-20261019.gz, with an AWS access key ID and signature embedded in the query string) to /tmp/.smh and decompresses it to /tmp/.smi. If running as root, or where passwordless sudo is available, it launches `sh /tmp/.smi agent` detached as a persistent agent; otherwise it extracts an embedded XMRig binary (bin/miner-linux-amd64, stored after a __PAYLOAD__ marker in the carrier) and runs it. The miner is configured via $HOME/.sysmond.json to mine rx/0 over TLS against the pool networkservicesupp[.]flashhub[.]net:8443 using a hardcoded Monero wallet and a hostname-derived worker name, with logging sent to /dev/null and thread count capped at min(nproc,4). To hide, the binary is copied to $HOME/.local/lib/<name>/<name> and the process is renamed to a random system-component-like name drawn from a pool including edid-mon, smmon, irqstatsd, kmod-cache, dmi-cache, acpi-polld and hwmon-sync. It is idempotent via /tmp/.sysmond.lock and a check for an existing connection on port 8443 (0x20FB) in /proc/net/tcp, and logs to /tmp/.sysmond.log.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Oct 26, 2026, 01:20 AM
analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 01:20 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.