LWA-2026-10846 confirmed malware
@opezneppelin/contracts@5.0.2
Malicious code in @opezneppelin/contracts (npm)
T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1059.003 · Windows Command ShellT1105 · Ingress Tool Transfer
Analysis
The postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.js) runs only on Windows and downloads a zip archive from hxxps://markslyc[.]catch[.]short[.]best/init/digit/ into a random temporary directory, extracts it with PowerShell, then executes any .exe file found inside as a detached process. This is a remote second-stage loader that runs attacker-supplied code on the installer's machine. The package name impersonates the legitimate @openzeppelin/contracts Solidity library.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 8, 2026, 03:36 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 8, 2026, 03:36 PM
Related advisories
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.