dolyame-ui-tabslayout@35.8.1
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-tabslayout (npm)
Analysis
On load, the package fingerprints the host OS/architecture and downloads a platform-specific second-stage binary over HTTPS from oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, and oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev (paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under %TEMP% on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c '... &' on POSIX). The package also queries c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru via DNS TXT. This is a remote binary download-and-execute dropper.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:55 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:56 AM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-memoizeweak@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-lazyrender@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-inputtools@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-inputtime@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-noindex@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-overridestyles@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-pageheader@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-progressline@35.8.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.