dolyame-ui-inputtools@35.8.1
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputtools (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package downloads and executes a second-stage binary. It fetches a platform-specific payload over HTTPS from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on OS/arch. If HTTPS fails it falls back to a DNS TXT chunked base64 transfer from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. The package presents itself as a telemetry/analytics SDK but performs no legitimate telemetry; it is a remote code download-and-execute dropper.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:41 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:42 AM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-inputtime@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-noindex@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-overridestyles@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-pageheader@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-progressline@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-popupcarousel@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-progresscircle@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-postcssconfig@35.8.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.