dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-picture-gallery@35.6.3
Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-desktop-bnpl-picture-gallery (npm)
Analysis
On load, the package's index.js requires _bridge.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe. If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfiltration channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, decoding base64 chunks. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched detached (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c "path &" on Unix). The behaviour is gated only by the DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK environment variables and a short-lived timestamp flag.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:57 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 05:02 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-card-gallery@35.9.5
- devplatform-supafetch@35.2.1
- devplatform-utils@35.5.2
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-skeleton@35.6.3
- devplatform-cli-contracts@35.7.3
- beaver-ui-smart-filter@35.1.9
- dolyame-ui-filter@35.5.3
- bigops-product-list@35.8.5
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.