devplatform-cli-plugin-generator@35.3.5
Malicious code in devplatform-cli-plugin-generator (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package runs a bootstrap that fingerprints the host platform/arch, then downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, path /pkg/package, with platform-specific variants /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTPS download fails it falls back to a DNS TXT-based resolver on the wel1[.]ru domain (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru) that reconstructs the payload from base64 TXT records. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in TEMP on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process (cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows, /bin/sh -c '... &' on POSIX). The package ships a large decoy telemetry module and a stub class; the malicious bootstrap runs automatically on import.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 01:32 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:13 PM
Related advisories
- dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-highlighted-text@35.5.6
- devplatform-react-query-s3-client@35.8.7
- dolyame-boxy-atom-desktop-bnpl-container@35.3.3
- devplatform-confirm-input@35.9.8
- bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-anchor-title@35.2.5
- bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-text-block@35.9.4
- devplatform-di@35.5.5
- devplatform-cli-contracts@35.7.3
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.