dolyame-ui-avatar@35.9.8
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-avatar (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package loads a bundled platform module that fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a binary payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe), with a DNS-TXT exfil fallback via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows) and executed detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe, so it outlives the parent process.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:50 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:03 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-documents@35.6.6
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-separator@35.5.2
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner@35.1.4
- dolyame-ui-action@35.6.3
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-main-banner@35.4.4
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-footer@35.4.3
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-floating-button@35.3.6
- dolyame-ui-accordion@35.2.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.