bigops-shared-ui@35.1.2
Malicious code in bigops-shared-ui (npm)
Analysis
bigops-shared-ui@35.1.2 is a trojanized package masquerading as a React component library but shipping no UI code. On require, setup.js fingerprints the platform/arch and downloads a platform-specific binary payload over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe). If the HTTP download fails it falls back to retrieving the payload chunked via DNS TXT records from c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru / net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe under TEMP on Windows), chmod 755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe /c start /b so it runs in the background. A state file (/tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state) throttles re-execution to once per ~5.7 hours. The payload is a remote second stage whose behaviour is not bundled in the package.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 02:24 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 04:04 PM
Related advisories
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-preset-container@35.3.2
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-image-with-caption@35.3.6
- dolyame-ui-avatar@35.9.8
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-documents@35.6.6
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-separator@35.5.2
- bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-shopping-banner@35.1.4
- dolyame-ui-action@35.6.3
- bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-main-banner@35.4.4
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.