dolyame-ui-pie@35.5.3
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-pie (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package fingerprints the host platform/arch and downloads a second-stage binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, and /pkg/package.exe. If HTTPS fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT channel that reassembles the payload from base64 chunks served under *.dl[.]wel1[.]ru (c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru). The fetched binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via /bin/sh -c '... &' or cmd.exe start /b. A large bundled lib/telemetry.js file is a decoy analytics-SDK disguise; DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT environment checks are evasion.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:21 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 5, 2026, 03:34 PM
Related advisories
- bigops-offers@35.6.8
- dolyame-ui-menu@35.6.1
- bigops-plugin-notification-builder@35.1.3
- dolyame-ui-loader@35.1.5
- eacq-auth@35.4.8
- dp-owners@35.2.6
- dolyame-ui-scroll@35.4.3
- eacq-acq-menu-core@35.9.7
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.