bigops-chats@35.9.6
Malicious code in bigops-chats (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package silently downloads and executes a platform-specific binary payload. It contacts obfuscated C2 servers (oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev) over HTTPS to fetch a binary from paths like /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on architecture. If HTTPS fails, it falls back to DNS TXT-record resolution against domains (sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, ext[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, pkg[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru, net[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru) to reconstruct the payload from base64-encoded chunks. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows) and spawned as a detached process. A stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state prevents re-execution within a TTL window. The package has no lifecycle hooks — the payload runs on import via a try/catch require() in the entry point.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:00 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 3, 2026, 07:09 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.