volna-boxy-di-test@20.3.8
Malicious code in volna-boxy-di-test (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package immediately downloads a platform-specific binary payload from one of four Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev) via HTTPS GET /pkg/package (or /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe depending on architecture). If HTTPS fails, it falls back to DNS TXT steganography via c[.]tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site (and platform-specific variants) to reconstruct the payload from chunked base64-encoded TXT records. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<random> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe on Windows) and executed as a detached background process. A stamp file at /tmp/.analytics_state prevents re-download within ~6.3 hours. The package has no repository, no README, and no declared purpose matching this behaviour.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 2, 2026, 10:24 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 2, 2026, 10:25 AM
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.