pfp-forms-sme-registration-ooo@20.2.1
Malicious code in pfp-forms-sme-registration-ooo (npm)
Analysis
On require(), the package executes _polyfill.js which fingerprints the OS and architecture, then downloads a platform-specific binary payload from Cloudflare Workers C2 endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf103-070[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf101-adf[.]workers[.]dev) via HTTPS GET to paths like /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe. If HTTP download fails, it falls back to DNS TXT chunked exfiltration from well1[.]site subdomains (tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, tina[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, ldr[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, win[.]dl[.]well1[.]site). The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (Linux/macOS) or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe (Windows) and executed as a detached background process via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. A state file at /tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state prevents re-download within ~20 seconds.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 2, 2026, 10:13 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 2, 2026, 10:16 AM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.