beaver-ui-header@12.3.9
Malicious code in beaver-ui-header (npm)
Analysis
The postinstall hook runs setup.js which downloads and executes a platform-specific binary payload. It detects the operating system and architecture, then fetches a binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker[.]cf) at paths /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe depending on the platform. If the primary download fails, it falls back to DNS TXT record-based payload delivery from domains tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, tina[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, ldr[.]dl[.]well1[.]site, and win[.]dl[.]well1[.]site. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<random hex> (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe on Windows) and launched as a detached hidden process. The package also attempts to load setup.js on import via require('./setup'). The package name (beaver-ui-header) and description ("UI toolkit") are a decoy — it contains no UI code.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 1, 2026, 01:04 PM
- analyzed
- Aug 1, 2026, 01:05 PM
Related advisories
- beaver-ui-grid@12.7.3
- beaver-ui-layout@12.9.6
- arbocrate-sla-prober-arbocrate-sla-prober-core@7.5.8
- afisha-storybook-default@9.7.10
- beaver-ui-card-large@9.6.3
- accounts-loading-state@8.9.4
- bcore-bravo-eslint-config@9.5.7
- accounts-timeline@9.6.10
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.