LWA-2026-7293 confirmed malware

@vallensofficial/baileys@9.4.6

Malicious code in @vallensofficial/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply Chain

Analysis

Combosquat of the @whiskeysockets/baileys WhatsApp library. The package ships a cloned Baileys codebase but redirects the `libsignal` dependency — the Signal Protocol encryption library that handles all WhatsApp message encryption and decryption — to a pinned tarball URL under the @queenanya scope (hxxps://registry[.]npmjs[.]org/@queenanya/libsignal/-/libsignal-5[.]0[.]5[.]tgz). This allows the attacker to serve arbitrary code in the encryption/decryption layer, enabling message interception, key compromise, or injection of malicious payloads into the WhatsApp communication pipeline. The README encourages users to alias the real `baileys` package to this fork.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Jul 30, 2026, 09:00 PM
analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 09:02 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.