express-mongo-limit@2.0.1
Malicious code in express-mongo-limit (npm)
Analysis
express-mongo-limit is a combosquat of the legitimate express-mongo-sanitize package. On install, the postinstall hook runs index.js which: (1) installs clipboardy and screenshot-desktop globally, (2) starts a crypto-clipper (service.js) that monitors the clipboard every second and replaces Ethereum (0x...), Bitcoin (bc1.../1.../3...), Solana, and Tron wallet addresses with the attacker's addresses — 0x62Fc857DE5469fDd81F57F309c2fb000cad7bbbb (ETH), bc1q8tzzpun6rd45s6fgar2up8nfelt4u2r2h999cc (BTC), 6A7vQWJveJBWP78oktAjoZbMakrCAQyLphJ5Kswy5xA4 (SOL), TUqk5th1eXZWrt1arsqpxZ3frqaCxc9Lr4 (TRX), (3) captures screenshots every 2 seconds and emails them to [account] via nodemailer, (4) exfiltrates all environment variables (process.env) via POST to hxxps://ipcheck-six[.]vercel[.]app/api, (5) registers PM2 startup for persistence. A commented-out code block would fetch from hxxps://gamboracle[.]vercel[.]app/api and execute the response via new Function() — a remote code execution channel.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Jul 7, 2026, 09:18 AM
- analyzed
- Jul 7, 2026, 09:19 AM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.