LWA-2026-5845 confirmed malware

shadxino@1.0.7

Malicious code in shadxino (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1059.001 · PowerShellT1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationT1564.003 · Hidden WindowT1056.001 · KeyloggingT1113 · Screen CaptureT1539 · Steal Web Session CookieT1543 · Create or Modify System ProcessT1562 · Impair DefensesT1082 · System Information Discovery

Analysis

shadxino@1.0.7 is a trojanized exam-cheating toolkit masquerading as a "DOM utility." When executed via the bin entry 'shadxino → bin/kalamasha-tool.js', it copies the Electron binary to SearchApp.exe (masquerading as Windows Search) and spawns it detached and hidden under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\. The spawned Electron app (package/main.js): (1) opens a hidden off-screen browser window to chatgpt[.]com with a hardcoded ChatGPT session-token cookie (__Secure-next-auth.session-token) for authenticated cheating; (2) uses Win32 FFI to set WDA_EXCLUDEFROMCAPTURE (invisible to screen sharing/recording) and WS_EX_TOOLWINDOW (hidden from Alt-Tab); (3) hooks global keyboard/mouse input via uiohook-napi; (4) polls every 50ms to maintain topmost z-order and restore itself if hidden by proctor software; (5) detects Safe Exam Browser desktop switches and spawns a child Electron process on the proctored desktop via CreateProcessW. Three bundled extraction scripts support the cheat pipeline: bin/chrome_cookies.ps1 steals Chrome/Edge cookies for openai[.]com/chatgpt[.]com domains (DPAPI + AES-256-GCM decryption, SQLite read), bin/stealth_capture.ps1 captures the foreground window as an in-memory base64 PNG (zero disk trace), and bin/uia_extract.py / bin/uia_get_text.ps1 extract text from proctored browser windows via Windows UI Automation. A 27MB compiled UIA binary (bin/uia_extract.exe) is also bundled. The watchdog in kalamasha-tool.js auto-respawns the Electron process on crash with adaptive backoff (2s/5s/15s) and refuses to exit unless a .kill_watchdog sentinel file exists. The package deploys to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Diagnostics\ and writes a boot.log there.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Jun 22, 2026, 06:12 PM
analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 06:14 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.