@yhong91/vibetime@0.1.3

Analysis

This package advertises itself as a CLI that installs activity-tracking hooks into AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, etc.) and uploads usage rollups. Its bundled bin/vibetime.mjs additionally targets a co-installed AI assistant language server (Antigravity / Codeium Windsurf): it enumerates the host process table (ps), regex-scrapes the language server private --csrf_token from its command line, discovers the PID localhost listening ports, then issues authenticated HTTP POSTs to 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:<port> RPC endpoints (Heartbeat, GetCascadeTrajectoryGeneratorMetadata) using the stolen CSRF token in an X-Codeium-Csrf-Token header with TLS verification disabled, harvesting the assistant session trajectory metadata. The collected data and the agent activity rollups are uploaded to a hardcoded raw IP endpoint at hxxp://121[.]196[.]224[.]82:3001 over plaintext HTTP, not the project advertised domain. It also spawns a detached, unref-ed background Node child process so a sync runner persists after the CLI exits. Stealing another local service authentication token from the process table to read its private session contents and shipping them to a hardcoded remote endpoint is credential/session theft.