autotel-edge@3.16.13
Malicious code in autotel-edge (npm)
Analysis
This package is published as a vendor-agnostic OpenTelemetry library for edge runtimes, but it ships a malicious install-time dropper. Its binding.gyp abuses node-gyp source command-expansion ("<!(node index.js > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo stub.c)") so that index.js is executed automatically during installation, before and independently of any package lifecycle scripts, with its output discarded. index.js itself is heavily obfuscated: a top-level eval() runs a Caesar/ROT13 character decoder that reconstructs JavaScript source at runtime. That decoded stage imports node:crypto and builds an AES-128-GCM decryption routine (createDecipheriv) which decrypts further hex-encoded blobs embedded in the file and evaluates the resulting cleartext as code, hiding the final payload behind two layers of decoding. This install-time, multi-stage self-decrypting execution is characteristic of a self-propagating npm worm that harvests cloud/registry credentials and tokens and uses them to compromise and republish further packages. Any environment that installed this version should treat exposed npm, cloud, and CI/OIDC credentials as compromised and rotate them.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Jun 7, 2026, 06:53 PM
- analyzed
- Jun 28, 2026, 10:40 AM
- weekly installs
- 503
Related advisories
- autotel-cloudflare@2.18.16
- autotel-devtools@0.1.1
- autotel-mcp@0.1.14
- autotel-subscribers@10.0.1
- creditcard.js@3.0.60
- @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab@2.1.2
- ai-sdk-ollama@0.13.1
- @immobiliarelabs/backstage-plugin-gitlab@1.0.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.