argoncrypt@1.2.3
Malicious code in argoncrypt (npm)
Analysis
TRUE POSITIVE — remote-code-execution dropper. lib/initializeCaller.js decodes base64-embedded URL "hxxps://tomato-brunhilda-40[.]tiiny[.]site/index[.]json", fetches it via axios.get(), extracts .data.cookie, and executes it via new Function.constructor("require", response) — giving the remote payload full Node.js require(). index.js silently spawns this as a detached child process (detached:true, stdio:'ignore', child.unref()) when the Express middleware is imported. Package masquerades as the pino logger (bundles pino docs/internals) under the unrelated name "argoncrypt". Publisher [account] tiiny[.]site is a known malware C2 hosting domain. No lifecycle hook needed — requires only require(). This is an active RCE supply-chain attack.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Jun 1, 2026, 02:16 PM
- analyzed
- Jun 1, 2026, 02:24 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.