queenjusmy-baileys-v1@1.0.9
Malicious code in queenjusmy-baileys-v1 (npm)
Analysis
A modified fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web API library that silently enrolls the installer's WhatsApp account into four fixed channels owned by the package author. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, inside makeNewsletterSocket(), two injected setTimeout blocks wait 90 seconds and then send newsletter "FOLLOW" queries over the already-authenticated WhatsApp socket (via the w:mex GraphQL endpoint), each scheduling a second follow 5 seconds later. The target channel JIDs are hidden as base64 string literals, and each call is wrapped in an empty try/catch so it fails invisibly: 120363400706010828@newsletter, 120363423257544642@newsletter, 120363349457176430@newsletter and 120363421052027188@newsletter. The 90-second delay places the action after library load, once the session is live. A fifth hardcoded channel, 120363402220977044@newsletter ("Queen Jusmy Md"), is stamped into forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo and newsletter contextInfo in lib/Utils/messages.js and lib/Socket/luxu.js so outgoing messages carry the author's channel branding. Nothing in the package documents these subscriptions or offers a way to disable them; they are not opt-in. The package does not steal WhatsApp session credentials, tokens, environment variables or files — its network traffic is confined to WhatsApp/Meta endpoints — the abuse is the covert, non-consensual subscription of the user's account.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 15, 2026, 09:31 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 16, 2026, 12:25 AM
- weekly installs
- 901
Related advisories
- @jiancodes/baileys@2.0.3
- @ravliesh/baileys@1.0.1
- @lubyzzxmods/baileys@2.0.4
- dapzsyz-baileysm@0.4.2
- amanexfujimiya-baileys@8.6.26
- @denzy-official/baileys@1.2.8
- alisaai-baileys@10.0.0
- raiden-baileys@2.2.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.