LWA-2026-14071 confirmed malware

@alannxds/baileys@6.2.13

Malicious code in @alannxds/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1071.001 · Web Protocols

Analysis

@alannxds/baileys (versions 6.2.12 and 6.2.13) is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library modified so that any account connecting through it is silently made to follow three hardcoded WhatsApp channels. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js the socket factory holds a hardcoded list of channel JIDs — 120363387182851100@newsletter, 120363371199176376@newsletter and 120363421367985094@newsletter — and issues a newsletter FOLLOW query (QueryIds.FOLLOW / XWAPaths.xwa2_newsletter_follow) for each of them: in 6.2.12 from a timed auto-follow routine (10s initial delay, 20s retries, up to 3 attempts) that runs even when no user action requests it, and in 6.2.13 from a module-level setTimeout of 150 seconds that iterates the IDs and follows them one by one 5 seconds apart. The follow uses the library's own authenticated WhatsApp session, so the connected user's account is enrolled as a subscriber without consent. lib/Socket/luxu.js additionally hardcodes channel branding into relayed event and poll-result messages, setting forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo to newsletterName "ᴀʟᴀɴɴxᴅ | ʜᴏʟᴏᴡ 徴" / newsletterJid 120363387182851100@newsletter, and stamps outgoing image messages with a "0@newsletter" forwarded card whose senderName is "AlannXD", so relayed content is presented as forwarded channel material. IOCs: WhatsApp channel JIDs 120363387182851100@newsletter, 120363371199176376@newsletter, 120363421367985094@newsletter; channel display name "ᴀʟᴀɴɴxᴅ | ʜᴏʟᴏᴡ 徴"; code paths lib/Socket/newsletter.js and lib/Socket/luxu.js.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 15, 2026, 10:47 PM
analyzed
Nov 15, 2026, 11:15 PM
weekly installs
383

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.