wiwusen@1.0.1
Malicious code in wiwusen (npm)
Analysis
The first agent's benign verdict is factually wrong: it claimed wiwusen@1.0.1's only file is a "plain name/description/version" manifest, but the actual 255-byte embedded package.json poisons its own dist metadata to point at file:./node_modules/nocuhel/payload with a zeroed shasum and injects fake _from/_resolved paths into /tmp/opencode/npmjs-dfa/ — a cross-package payload pointer, not a name-squat. The referenced companion package nocuhel@1.0.0 (same 'helper utilities' description, same actor pattern) contains a prepare lifecycle hook running prep.js via node, which requires child_process and does: cp.execFileSync('/bin/sh',['-c','id > '+process.env.HOME+'/.npm-npmjs-dfa-id-<op-tag>']) plus a hidden 0600 marker write into $HOME tagged 'npmjs-dfa-20261112T195530Z' — the exact same operation tag/namespace that appears in wiwusen@1.0.1's registry manifest _from/_resolved, proving one coordinated authorship operation. nocuhel also embeds a payload/package.json masquerading as 'wiwusen' (identity laundering matching the poisoned manifest's path) and declares a dependency literally named 'decoy'. This is the classic shape of an npm supply-chain attack exercise/operation: coordinated multi-package publish, manifest poisoning with file: pointers, identity-confused nested payloads, install-time shell execution on consumer machines, hidden $HOME canary writes. There is no plausible benign or dual-use purpose (it is not a proxy/VPN/miner/telemetry tool); the demonstrated capability is arbitrary install-time code execution with cross-package provenance obfuscation. uphold_malicious: wiwusen@1.0.1 is malicious infrastructure / the visible stage of a coordinated malicious npm operation, not a benign placeholder.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 13, 2026, 10:14 AM
- analyzed
- Nov 13, 2026, 10:19 AM
Related advisories
- wiwusen@1.0.5 same package
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.