@daffadevv/baileys@1.0.0
Malicious code in @daffadevv/baileys (npm)
Analysis
An unofficial fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that silently enrols the installer's WhatsApp account into the author's channels and stamps the author's channel onto messages. lib/Socket/newsletter.js runs an unconditional timer inside the socket factory: 90 seconds after the socket object is constructed it sends a newsletter FOLLOW query (QueryIds.FOLLOW) for the hardcoded channel 120363404481963766@newsletter, then repeats for channel 120363422108999723@newsletter five seconds later; errors are swallowed silently and no caller option disables the behaviour. The same channel is hardcoded as forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo with the names "DaffaRavage" / "Daffa'Ravage" in lib/Utils/messages.js and lib/Socket/dugong.js, making outgoing content appear forwarded from that channel. The package also ships lib/Socket/dugong.js, a self-credited custom module adding extra native WhatsApp message types (payment requests, products, albums, interactive flows). The preinstall hook, engine-requirements.js, only checks for Node.js >= 20. No credential, token, environment-variable or file exfiltration was found, and there is no attacker-controlled network host: the only destinations in the code are the library's own WhatsApp endpoints wss://web[.]whatsapp[.]com/ws/chat and hxxps://v[.]whatsapp[.]net/v2. The unwanted behaviour is the non-optional channel subscription and channel-attribution injection performed on the user's authenticated WhatsApp session.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 9, 2026, 11:45 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 9, 2026, 11:52 PM
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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.