LWA-2026-13807 MAL-2026-18861 ↗ confirmed malware

@langitdeveloper/baileys@2.1.0

Malicious code in @langitdeveloper/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1105 · Ingress Tool TransferT1102 · Web ServiceT1071.001 · Web Protocols

Analysis

A fork of the Baileys WhatsApp client published under an unofficial scope (`@langitdeveloper/baileys`) that silently enrols the authenticated user's WhatsApp account into third-party channels. In `lib/Socket/newsletter.js`, `makeNewsletterSocket()` starts an async task when the socket is created that fetches a channel list over HTTPS from `hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/FadelSM/IDCH/refs/heads/main/idch[.]json`, then, after a 90-second `setTimeout`, issues the WhatsApp `w:mex` newsletter FOLLOW mutation (query id 7871414976211147) for every JID in that list via `Promise.allSettled(...)`. The enrolment runs unprompted, is not exposed as a caller-controlled option, and returns nothing to the application, so the installing account joins operator-chosen channels without consent. The remote list is attacker-controlled, so the set of channels can change without a new release. Additionally, `lib/Socket/dugong.js` (`handleEvent`) injects `contextInfo.forwardedNewsletterMessageInfo` with a hardcoded channel — `newsletterName: "shenvn."`, `newsletterJid: "120363430179804706@newsletter"` — into every event message the account relays, attributing forwarded content to that channel. The package also swaps the signal-protocol dependency for a third-party GitHub fork (`github:RILLYZY/libsignal-node`). IOCs: raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/FadelSM/IDCH/refs/heads/main/idch.json; WhatsApp newsletter JID 120363430179804706@newsletter; FOLLOW query id 7871414976211147.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 9, 2026, 11:52 PM
analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 11:53 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.