LWA-2026-13797 MAL-2026-18810 ↗ confirmed malware

@billabilloyy/baileys@1.0.0

Malicious code in @billabilloyy/baileys (npm)

T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply ChainT1059.007 · JavaScriptT1497.003 · Time Based EvasionT1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1647 · Account Manipulation

Analysis

@billabilloyy/baileys is a republished fork of the WhatsApp library baileys (@whiskeysockets/baileys) under an unofficial scope. Beyond the upstream code it adds an unconditional forced-follow payload that runs whenever a socket is created. In src/WAUSync/Protocols/USyncNewsletterProtocol.js the makeNewsletterSocket wrapper schedules setTimeout callbacks at 50 s and 90 s that issue QueryIds.FOLLOW requests for five hardcoded WhatsApp newsletter JIDs: 120363400362472743@newsletter, 120363395678317603@newsletter, 120363426470081124@newsletter, 120363427718144294@newsletter and 120363408893555851@newsletter. src/Socket/newsletter.js contains four further 90-second timers that follow a channel whose JID is concealed in a base64 literal rather than a readable string. Both files are on the default require path (src/index.js -> Socket/index -> messages-send -> username -> USyncNewsletterProtocol), so any bot built on the package silently enrols its own WhatsApp account into the author's channels; the long timers place the subscribe calls outside the window in which an install or first require is normally inspected. The package also declares dependency ranges (@cacheable/node-cache, cache-manager) that resolve to versions carrying a known malicious payload. There is no network endpoint outside WhatsApp's own web protocol in the follow payload; the observed behaviour is account manipulation via hardcoded, partly obfuscated channel identifiers.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 9, 2026, 11:43 PM
analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 11:45 PM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.