LWA-2026-13762 confirmed malware

vcnwi-ihpgp-util@0.0.0-stage

Malicious code in vcnwi-ihpgp-util (npm)

Analysis

This is a family of look-alike "*-util" packages (smfos-bskdz-util, tsbwt-hawsi-util, jmrwd-gjdob-util, nuadg-jhtvh-util, vcnwi-ihpgp-util) published in staged version triples that hide a code-execution channel. The 0.0.0-stage builds are manifest-only stubs described as "Temporary package placeholder for staged publishing"; the 1.0.0 builds ship an entry point that only sets module.exports to an empty object; the 1.0.1 builds ship the loader. On require of index.js, the loader reads a small integer array stored under a non-standard key inside package.json ("_b" XOR-decoded with 0x96, or "_bz" run through zlib.inflateSync) and executes the decoded string as JavaScript through the Function constructor with `require` and `__dirname` in scope — an eval-equivalent whose payload never appears in the package's source files. After running the decoded string, index.js replaces module.exports with an empty object so the package looks like a no-op utility. jmrwd-gjdob-util@1.0.1 splits the operation across two files: index.js decodes into globalThis.__rc and lib/runner.js executes it with the Function constructor then deletes it. The payload decoded in the 1.0.1 builds is a trivial `console.log(1)` test string, so the staged first stage is inert; the shipped mechanism is a reusable harness for delivering arbitrary code. No network destinations, URLs, IPs, or credential-file paths are present in the delivered bytes.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 9, 2026, 01:20 AM
analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 01:22 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.