dsh-lifecycle@0.1.10
Malicious code in dsh-lifecycle (npm)
Analysis
dsh-lifecycle ships the codebase of the dsh-auth-gateway login-gateway plugin (cordis.patch.yml is headed "dsh-auth-gateway bundle patch"; it reads the "dsh-auth-gateway/cookie-secure" credential record and its fallback repository points at github[.]com/xbzbing/dsh-auth-gateway) republished under a different package name and repository (github[.]com/floatDreamWithSong/dsh-lifecycle). On top of the cloned gateway it adds privileged installer scripts that no npm lifecycle hook runs, only manual invocation: scripts/install-systemd.mjs creates /etc/dsh-lifecycle, copies dist/supervisor.js to /opt/dsh-lifecycle/supervisor.js and enables a root-owned dsh-lifecycle.service; scripts/install-launchd.mjs writes LaunchAgents plists; scripts/install-windows.mjs registers "DSH-Lifecycle-*" scheduled tasks that launch a hidden PowerShell script with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and rewrites directory ACLs with icacls. The installed controller listens on a control socket and runs npm install --registry=hxxps://registry[.]npmjs[.]org @deepseek-ai/dsh@<channel> as the service user. The plugin reads the DeepSeek Harness credential record client-connection/browser-session and mints upstream browser-auth cookies from it, and the bundled dsh-lifecycle-reset binary renames password.json, otp.json, sessions.json and passkeys.json to .reset-backup-<timestamp>. All outbound network destinations in the package are registry[.]npmjs[.]org and the repository URLs above; page and proxy traffic stays on 127[.]0[.]0[.]1.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 5, 2026, 04:35 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 5, 2026, 04:37 PM
- weekly installs
- 1,006
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.