tailwindcss-form-utils@0.5.9
Malicious code in tailwindcss-form-utils (npm)
Analysis
tailwindcss-form-utils@0.5.9 is a trojanized clone of the Tailwind CSS forms plugin (it claims the tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-forms repository and description) whose main entry, src/index.js, carries an injected obfuscated payload in front of the genuine plugin code. The file begins with eval(atob("...")) which decodes a base64 blob into a string-table-obfuscated script that uses the self-identifier marker A10-(*-*). On install and require, that payload performs contract-resolved command-and-control over public Ethereum infrastructure: - JSON-RPC eth_blockNumber / eth_getBlockByNumber POSTs to hxxps://1rpc[.]io/eth, hxxps://eth[.]drpc[.]org/, hxxps://ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com/ and hxxps://eth-mainnet[.]public[.]blastapi[.]io/ — no C2 hostname appears in the source, it is read from chain state at runtime. - A dead-drop lookup of transaction history for address 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3 via hxxps://eth[.]blockscout[.]com/api?module=account&action=txlist&address=0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3&startblock=0&endblock=99999999&sort=desc&filterby=from - Stage fetches to the derived paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls carrying the custom header Sec-V: A10-(*-*) together with a spoofed Chrome user agent. The package also carries a lifecycle-free but executed install footprint: the payload runs whenever the module is loaded. Anyone who installed 0.5.9 should treat the host as compromised, remove the package, and rotate credentials available to the process.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Nov 3, 2026, 09:21 PM
- analyzed
- Nov 3, 2026, 09:36 PM
- weekly installs
- 68
Related advisories
- tailwindcss-form-utils@0.0.0-stage same package
- tailwindcss-form-utils@0.5.1 same package
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.