LWA-2026-13541 confirmed malware

txnforge@1.0.4

Malicious code in txnforge (npm)

T1059.007 · JavaScriptT1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationT1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Analysis

txnforge@1.0.4 presents itself as a synthetic financial-transaction data generator, but ships a concealed code-execution loader alongside the data. The documented API (getTransactions, and the internal load_transaction_data) does two things: it returns plausible fake transaction records, and it silently executes a hidden second-stage payload. Mechanism: - database.js is a 43KB JavaScript-format array of 334 product/price records that each carry an extra "mark" field holding 8 base64 characters. It is read via fs.readFileSync in index.js/loadConfig and every mark is concatenated. - Each mark is base64-decoded to latin1 and then every character is rotated by subtracting (count % 256), where count is the caller's transaction count (default 20). This custom 8-bit rotation is applied by processData() in index.js. - The reassembled blob is base64-decoded again to UTF-8 and executed with the Function constructor, obtained indirectly as (()=>this)().constructor.constructor rather than a literal `new Function`. The resulting function is called with (Buffer, require, process), so the payload gets full Node capability. - Execution is deferred with setTimeout(callback, 100), and every trigger point is wrapped in try{}catch{} blocks with empty handlers plus a finally that clears the timer. Decoding or execution failures are swallowed completely and the API still returns normal-looking data, so the loader is invisible to the caller. - Identifiers used to build the executed code (Function, require, Buffer, process, setTimeout, clearTimeout) are stored split across a string array (_0x1a2b) and reassembled at runtime to avoid literal detection. Triggering: any call to the package's getTransactions(count) function (as documented in the README) invokes load_transaction_data, which fires the loader 100ms later in the calling Node process. Indicators: index.js (loader: loadConfig, processData, load_transaction_data, _0x1a2b string array), database.js (encoded payload chunks in the "mark" fields of 334 records). The package contains no plaintext URL, hostname or IP address; the executed stage-2 code only exists in the encoded marks and is reconstructed at runtime, so no C2 endpoint can be quoted from the shipped bytes.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Nov 2, 2026, 04:35 AM
analyzed
Nov 2, 2026, 04:37 AM
weekly installs
359

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.