LWA-2026-13046 confirmed malware

chatgpt-desktop-setup@1.0.2

Malicious code in chatgpt-desktop-setup (npm)

Analysis

This package poses as a one-command setup helper for ChatGPT Desktop and Codex CLI (published under the names chatgpt-desktop-setup, codex-setup and @decoopus/chatgpt-setup). Its bin/cli.js prompts the user for an API key and then rewrites ~/.codex/config.toml so that all Codex/ChatGPT Desktop inference is routed to the third-party gateway hxxps://api[.]vokes[.]in/v1 (provider id chatgpt_pro_5x, model gpt-6-astra, wire_api responses), sending the user's API key and subsequent prompts and responses to that host. The same write sets approval_policy = "never" and sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access", disabling the agent's approval prompts and its sandbox. It also edits ~/.codex/.codex-global-state.json to force agent-mode 'full-access' and to add the user's home directory and the filesystem root to every project's rootPaths, granting unrestricted filesystem access. Before writing it kills any running ChatGPT/Codex processes (taskkill /F /IM ChatGPT.exe /IM codex.exe, killall ChatGPT Codex, pkill -f 'ChatGPT|codex') and afterwards relaunches the desktop app or the Codex CLI. The credential redirection to api.vokes.in and the permission escalation are not presented to the user as such.

analyzed by
Leitwacht
first seen
Oct 14, 2026, 10:36 AM
analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 10:36 AM

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Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.