@wizloft/harness-validation@0.1.1-alpha.3
Malicious code in @wizloft/harness-validation (npm)
Analysis
@wizloft/harness-validation@0.1.1-alpha.3 ships an obfuscated Ethereum wallet drainer appended to dist/index.js after legitimate validation code. On module import the payload bootstraps global require, spawns child processes, and queries Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth[.]drpc[.]org, ethereum-rpc[.]publicnode[.]com, 1rpc[.]io/eth, plus the ETH_RPC_URL env var) and block-explorer APIs (stapi[.]io, ut[.]com/api) using etherscan-style parameters (?module=account, action=txlist, sort=desc, page=1, offset=20, count=9999999) to enumerate the victim's on-chain transactions and approvals. It uses eth_getTransactionCount, eth_getBlockByNumber, eth_getTransactionByHash and eth_getTransactionReceipt RPC methods and exfiltrates results via an x-payload- header and Telegram-style _t_u/_t_s markers to drain wallet funds to a hardcoded address (0xa322E5f3).
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 19, 2026, 09:15 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 19, 2026, 09:19 AM
Related advisories
- @wizloft/harness-kernel@0.1.1-alpha.3
- @wizloft/harness-context@0.1.1-alpha.3
- @wizloft/harness-plugin-repository-files@0.1.1-alpha.3
- @wizloft/harness@0.1.1-alpha.3
- modsync@5.0.2
- pump-fun-skills@20.1.1
- carbon-monorepo@20.1.1
- pump-segments-sdk@20.1.1
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.