dolyame-ui-scrollblock@35.8.1
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-scrollblock (npm)
Analysis
On require, the package fingerprints the OS/architecture and downloads a second-stage binary from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker[.]cf100-416[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf99-9b3[.]workers[.]dev, oob-worker[.]cf102-baf[.]workers[.]dev, path /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, or /pkg/package.exe). If the download fails it falls back to a DNS-TXT exfiltration channel via c[.]sdk[.]dl[.]wel1[.]ru. The downloaded payload is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> (or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe in the Windows temp dir), made executable, and launched as a detached background process via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c '... &'. This is a remote binary download-and-execute dropper that runs automatically when the module is loaded.
- analyzed by
- Leitwacht
- first seen
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:27 AM
- analyzed
- Aug 7, 2026, 10:28 AM
Related advisories
- dolyame-ui-tablemobile@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-tableinline@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-tabsblock@35.8.1
- dolyame-ui-dataqa@35.8.1
- bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-faq-item@35.8.2
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-faq@35.8.7
- devplatform-react-mcp@35.5.6
- dolyame-boxy-independent-bnpl-main-title@35.5.6
Independently detected by the Leitwacht supply-chain probe. IOCs are defanged. Published CC0. Think this is a mistake? See the dispute policy.